A pulse of twenty days between Moncloa and Madrid that settled the state of alarm

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A pulse of twenty days between Moncloa and Madrid that settled the state of alarm







© Provided by Agencia EFE



Madrid, Oct 10 (EFE) .- The state of alarm in the capital and eight Madrid municipalities is the result of a sum of disagreements between Moncloa and the Government of Madrid but also the failure of the Covid-19 Group, created by both administrations ago 20 days with the objective -not achieved- of a consensus plan in the face of the second wave of infections.

With the declaration, this Friday, of the state of alarm for 15 days and at the start of the Pilar bridge, the Executive of Pedro Sánchez has put an end to the disagreements with the Madrid government, which have flared up in the last 24 hours as a result of the order of the Superior Court of Justice of Madrid (TSJM) that annulled the measures that limited mobility, imposed by Health.

This is the chronology of a series of encounters and disagreements between Sánchez and the president of Madrid, Isabel Díaz Ayuso, starting on September 21, when both leaders staged a showy act of understanding in the fight against the pandemic, which turned out to be fleeting .

THE PHOTO OF THE TRUCE

On September 21 and after weeks of crossed reproaches, Pedro Sánchez and Isabel Díaz Ayuso staged in the Royal Post Office, surrounded by 24 flags, the photo of the cooperation because this, Sánchez said at the time, is an “epidemiological battle, not an ideological one. “.

The meeting ended with a single announcement: the creation of the Covid-19 Group to maintain effective contact between the two administrations.

That same week, Díaz Ayuso announced that he planned to extend the restrictions to other areas of Madrid. “It would not be coherent to do otherwise.”

Until that moment, mobility restrictions affected only health areas located in the south, with an incidence of 1,000 infections per 100,000 inhabitants. The decision to close the south was interpreted as discrimination towards the poorest neighborhoods.

Although the dialogue of the Covid-19 Group continued that week, on September 24 the Minister of Health, Salvador Illa, raised his tone, warned that “very tough weeks” were coming and asked Díaz Ayuso for “determination” to take control of the pandemic.

That day, the Covid-19 Group, created as a “Space for cooperation between the governments of Spain and Madrid”, agreed to appoint Emilio Bouza, an expert in infectious diseases and founder of the Spanish Society of Microbiology, as spokesperson.

The restrictions of Díaz Ayuso receive the support of the Prosecutor’s Office that endorses the confinements of Madrid without the need for a state of alarm and demands that the Superior Court of Justice confirm the order of the Community to confine 37 sanitary zones.

On September 25, the fracture between the two governments becomes visible. While Díaz Ayuso extends the measures to new peripheral areas, Illa asks to close Madrid and apply restrictive measures in the municipalities with an incidence of more than 500 infections per one hundred thousand inhabitants.

THE DIMISSION OF BOUZA AND THE GHOST OF 155

On September 26 and 48 hours after being appointed, Emilio Bouza resigned as spokesman for the Covid Group. “I have been able to understand that this is not my position under the current circumstances,” he says in the resignation letter.

Illa demands Madrid to review its confinement plan while the national spokesman of the PP and mayor of Madrid, José Luis Martínez-Almeida, accuses the Minister of Health of “entangling” and confusing the people of Madrid “by invoking 155. It is stoking fire”.

The following days the ghost of the “intervention” grows and in the Community of Madrid the differences within the Government become visible.

THE INTER-TERRITORIAL HEALTH AGREEMENT

On September 30, the Interterritorial Health Council approved by majority restrictions in municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants with an incidence of more than 500 cases in 14 days.

The agreement contemplates two other requirements: a percentage of positivity in the tests greater than 10%, and an occupation in the ICU by covid patients greater than 35%. Only Madrid and its municipalities fall within these parameters.

Díaz Ayuso assures that “legally” the decision is not valid.

On October 1 Health publishes in the BOE the agreement to close Madrid, which is “mandatory”.

The resolution, which is not a ministerial order, sets a maximum period of 48 hours to adopt the measures. Díaz Ayuso obeys the order but advises that he will appeal.

“This Community is not in default, we will comply with all orders strictly because we are not like its pro-independence partners,” said the head of the Madrid regional executive before filing an appeal before the National Court.

On October 2, the Community of Madrid publishes in its Official Gazette (the BOCM) the limitations that came into force that night. Once the measures are published, the Community sends a request for ratification to the Madrid TSJ, which will rule on it after receiving the report from the Prosecutor’s Office.

On October 4, Illa warns that if the measures do not work, they will have to be increased and recalls that the capital already exceeds 700 positives per 100,000 inhabitants.

On October 5, the Community notifies declines in cases but Health subtracts value and ensures that it is about delays in the records.

The Community insists that the plan implementing in 46 health areas works and asks Illa to withdraw the order that restricts mobility in ten municipalities.

The controversy of the data worsens and suspicions increase not only between the central government and that of Madrid, but also within it.

THE TSJ OF MADRID TAKES CONFINEMENT

The final setback comes on October 8 when the Superior Court of Justice (TSJ) of Madrid knocks down the perimeter confinement of the capital and nine municipalities.

The judges maintain that the order supposes an interference of the public powers in the rights of the citizens and has not been authorized by the Courts.

However, the rest of the measures that limit capacity and hours remain in force.

After the TSJM’s order, Pedro Sánchez leaves the door open to the state of alarm but offers Díaz Ayuso three scenarios: that the Community of Madrid issues an order with special measures; to request the Government to declare a state of alarm; or that he is the one who makes the decision.

They lavish, unsuccessfully, a chain of messages back and forth. Sánchez convenes an extraordinary Council of Ministers and decrees the state of alarm. Díaz Ayuso contacts Sánchez and asks for time (the last time they contacted is during the Council). The Prime Minister informs you that the decision has been made.

Illa reports the decree to the media with very harsh words towards the Government of Madrid: “The president has decided not to do anything, we cannot sit back”, “patience has a limit, there is no more blind than the one who does not want to see “.

Begoña Fernandez

(c) EFE Agency

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